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THE NINE LIVES OF THE STABILITY PACT 
A SPECIAL REPORT 
OF THE 
CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
DANIEL GROS, THOMAS MAYER & ANGEL UBIDE 
Summary and Overview 
his report has three parts. Part I provides an overview of the political 
and institutional issues confronting the EU after the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) declined to endorse the 
recommendations of the European Commission to continue taking further 
steps in the excessive deficit procedure as specified in the Treaty of 
Maastricht against France and Germany. We conclude that France and 
Germany scored only a pyrrhic victory on 25 November 2003. They are 
likely to realise sooner rather than later that the political costs of flouting the 
Treaty will mount unless they change their attitude. At any rate, the Treaty 
provisions and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) imply that the excessive 
deficit procedure cannot be halted until the country found in violation 
undertakes additional measures to bring its deficit under control. Thus, 
unless France and Germany change their fiscal policy, the clash that arose at 
the end of 2003 is likely to continue for some time. 
Part II summarises the main economic arguments in support of prudent fiscal 
policy, especially in the context of the low potential growth that characterises 
the EU today. France and Germany face an unsustainable debt accumulation 
if they persist with their current structural deficits.  
Based on the evaluation in the previous parts, we argue in Part III, that there 
is no need to soften either the Treaty or the Stability Pact. On the contrary, 
their enforcement should be strengthened. We also propose a concrete 
mechanism to minimise the political element in the early warning system and 
to place it on an objective basis.  
Key Policy Conclusions 
1.  The source of the conflict between the European Commission and the 
Council that erupted in November 2003 was not the Stability and 
Growth Pact, but rather the prohibition of excessive deficits contained in 
the Treaty of Maastricht. This clause, which states that deficits should 
normally be below 3% of GDP, should not be altered. It is even more 
appropriate now than when it was first agreed in 1991, because of the 
slowdown of potential growth in Europe. 
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2.  The powers of the European Commission in the excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP) should be enhanced as proposed by the draft 
Constitutional Treaty still under discussion by governments. The 
Commission should be given more resources to improve budget 
monitoring and forecasting. 
3.  To avoid a repetition of the debacle of November 2003, two main 
changes are necessary: 
•  Monitoring of national budgets should be enhanced during 
upswings, to avoid a deterioration of structural balances; and 
•  Incentive structures should be strengthened through a system that, 
starting from the initial stages of the process, exacts a political cost 
for non-compliance.  
4.  Announcements of the death of the Stability and Growth Pact are 
premature. The Pact is likely to come back as France and Germany 
perceive the mounting political costs of flouting the Treaty. 
5.  Present French and German fiscal policy is not sustainable, because if 
continued, it leads to massive debt accumulation. Hence, one would have 
to call France and Germany to order even under a revised SGP that had 
shifted the emphasis to debt build-up. 
6.  The EU rules would not have forced France and Germany to conduct a 
pro-cyclical policy. Most forecasts for 2004 point to above-trend growth, 
so a reduction in cyclically adjusted deficits is entirely appropriate. 
7.  Both the Commission and the Council should concentrate on the 
quickest way to achieve a correction of fiscal policy in France and 
Germany. No one stands to gain by letting the legal challenge regarding 
the procedure used by ECOFIN (Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council) in November escalate into an inter-institutional confrontation. 
8.  Pacta sunt servanda. It is extremely dangerous to argue that a country is 
not obliged to follow EU rules simply because some economists do not 
agree with them. This rationale might in future be applied to other issues, 
such as state aids and central bank independence, and creates a very bad 
precedent for the enlargement process. | 3 
Part I. Legal and Institutional Issues 
n 25 November 2003, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(ECOFIN) was presented with a recommendation from the European 
Commission to take further steps in the excessive deficit procedure 
against France and Germany. This procedure, foreseen in Article 104 of the 
Treaty, had been started in early 2003 when it had become clear that both 
countries had violated the 3% limit on public deficits in 2002. In early 2003, 
both France and Germany therefore did not object to the launch of the 
excessive deficit procedure against them. Both countries then accepted 
concrete recommendations on how they should rein in their deficits during 
2003.  
By November of last year, however, it had become clear that neither country 
had reduced its deficit. On the contrary, in fact, their deficits had expanded. 
In the view of the European Commission (which we support), this meant that 
both countries had not followed the recommendations that had been formally 
decided – with the cooperation of France and Germany – in January of 2003. 
Since the Treaty specifies quite clearly that further steps have to be taken 
when a country fails to follow the recommendations it has received in the 
context of the excessive deficit procedure, it was thus natural that the 
European Commission felt duty-bound to present a recommendation to the 
Council that further action be taken against the two offending countries.  
In early November of 2003, the Commission thus decided to recommend to 
the Council that two further steps should be taken under the relevant Treaty 
provisions against France and Germany at the ECOFIN meeting of 
November 25. To come into force, however, these recommendations 
required a qualified majority in the Council, but this did not happen. A 
majority of the member countries voted for the recommendations of the 
Commission, but this did not, by far, constitute a qualified majority as the 
large member countries did not support the Commission. After a long and 
heated discussion, ECOFIN then adopted in the early morning (technically 
already on November 26) Council Conclusions in which it stated it had 
“decided” not to proceed against Germany and “agreed to hold in abeyance” 
the excessive deficit procedure against France and Germany. To understand 
the ensuing legal battle, it is important to underline that although ECOFIN 
used the wording “The Council decided” these Council Conclusions most 
probably did not constitute a legally binding decision in the sense of the 
Treaty. 
In January 2004, the Commission then decided to ask the European Court of 
Justice to rule whether ECOFIN had used the proper procedure in arriving at 
the Conclusions that were made public in the morning of 26 November 2003. 
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1.  The Stability Pact, post-November 25? 
The refusal by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council on November 25 
to apply the excessive deficit procedure against France and Germany (not 
really a legally binding decision to “hold in abeyance”, see Box 1) combined 
with the decision of the Commission to take the Council to the European 
Court of Justice has provoked much talk about the need to reform the 
Stability Pact. Many commentators, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world, 
have long argued against the provision that member states should aim at a 
balanced budget over the cycle. However, this is the one provision of the 
Stability Pact that has been completely irrelevant so far.  
It is not widely appreciated that the unfortunate ECOFIN “decision” of 
November 25 concerned exclusively the application of Article 104(8) and (9) 
of the Treaty of Maastricht. No reform of the Stability Pact would have 
changed the situation at that stage.  
Emphasising the difference between the Stability Pact and the Treaty is not 
just nit-picking. It has important legal and political implications. Avoiding 
repetitions of the conflict that arose in November 2003 would require a 
change in the Treaty, which in turn would require ratification by all 
parliaments (probably all 25). One might argue that this should now be easy 
since the Treaty revision process is already underway. However, the draft 
Constitutional Treaty as elaborated by the Convention has left all the 
economic provisions of the Maastricht Treaty intact for no one had argued in 
the Convention that the prohibition of excessive deficits in the Treaty needed 
to be changed. If France and Germany (and potentially other allies) wanted 
to change the economic provisions of the Treaty, they would inject another 
highly contentious element in the on-going intergovernmental conference 
(IGC). Moreover, countries like Spain would certainly exact a high price for 
their agreement to any attempt to weaken the excessive deficit procedure. 
This implies that there will probably be an animated discussion over the next 
few months concerning the need to reform the Stability Pact, but that will be 
beside the point. The real reason why the public discussion is focusing on the 
SGP (instead of the Treaty prohibition of excessive deficits) is, of course, 
that the SGP never enjoyed the same degree of acceptance as did the Treaty.  
Moreover, it is often overlooked that the ECOFIN decision of November 25 
did not even intend to settle the matter once and for all. Indeed ECOFIN only 
said the following (see Annex 3 for the full text of the Council Conclusions): 
… the Council decided not to act, at this point in time, on the basis 
of the Commission Recommendation for a Council decision under 
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The Council agrees to hold the Excessive Deficit Procedure for 
Germany in abeyance for the time being.  
Box 1. The night of the long knives 
The formal ECOFIN meeting of November 25
th was preceded by the (informal) 
Eurogroup meeting the day before at which the different positions were thrashed 
out. The formal decision, however, had to be taken by the full ECOFIN under 
Article 104 of the Treaty. 
The first point for ECOFIN on this day was the vote on two Council 
Recommendations, prepared by the Commission, under Article 104(8) on the 
excessive deficit procedure – one for France and another for Germany. The 
Commission proposed that Germany should cut its structural deficit by 0.8% and 
0.5% over the next two years and that France should make an adjustment of 
0.8% and 0.6% over the same period (see Annexes 1 and 2 for details). These 
votes had to be taken because France and Germany had not delivered the deficit 
reductions they had undertaken under Article 104.7 (although they had 
implemented some of the specific actions recommended to them). Under Article 
104(8), all EU member countries have a vote, except the country concerned. The 
result was the same in both cases: each of the Commission’s recommendations 
obtained a majority of member countries (8 for, 6 against), but this did not 
constitute the required qualified majority. (The five supporting the Franco-
German axis were: Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and, of course, the UK.) 
A second point for ECOFIN was the vote on two Recommendations to the 
Council, prepared by the Commission, under Article 104(9) on the excessive 
deficit procedure – again one for Germany and another for France (see Annexes 
1 and 2). Under this article, only euro area member countries have a vote (again 
except the country concerned). The result was in both cases the same: Each of 
the Commission’s recommendations obtained a majority of euro area member 
countries (6 for, 5 against), but this did not constitute the required qualified 
majority. (The four euro area members supporting the Franco-German axis were: 
Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal.) 
As the Commission’s proposals had not received the required qualified majority, 
the next question was whether a different position could muster such a majority. 
A long discussion ensued. One option would have been to simply adjourn the 
meeting, but the (Italian) presidency preferred not to end the meeting without at 
least some results. This was highly contentious, but in a second round of voting 
on the wording of the Council Conclusions (not a formal decision) proposed by 
the Council Presidency (see Annex 3), a qualified majority was reached, but 
barely: 7 countries for, 4 against. The hold-outs for the strict application of the 
Treaty were at this point only Spain, Austria, the Netherlands and Finland. These 
countries together have 20 votes. A blocking minority would have been 21 votes. 
It is thus clear that if one other small country had stuck to its guns, the contested 
ECOFIN conclusions would not have passed.  6 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
Leaving aside the fact that it is not quite clear from a legal point of view 
what was meant by the verbs “decided” and “agrees”, it is apparent that the 
political signal that ECOFIN wanted to give was not that France and 
Germany were off the hook for good. But what was meant by “for the time 
being”? A further paragraph in the Council Conclusions says clearly that the 
next occasion will be when Germany has to present its bi-annual update to its 
Stability Programme. This implies that by early (March or April) 2004, the 
EU will be back to square one because at that point: 
The Council stands ready to take a decision under Article 
104(9), on the basis of the Commission Recommendation, 
should Germany fail to act in accordance with commitments set 
out in these conclusions… 
The commitments taken by Germany in the ECOFIN meeting of November 
25 are thus binding only from a political point of view because the Council 
Conclusions have no legal value (for details, see Box 2). But this text had the 
explicit support of the German delegation. Germany is thus committed to 
reducing the cyclically adjusted deficit by 0.6% of GDP in 2004 and by a 
further 0.5% of GDP in 2005. This is not onerous, but Germany has so far 
had a tendency not to stick to any of its commitments (it promised repeatedly 
during 2002 and 2003 that it would avoid an excessive deficit – see below). 
No change in the Stability Pact, however quickly agreed, could change the 
situation in early 2004: if Germany has failed to stick even to this 
commitment, the Commission will again have to resubmit the proposal that 
did not find the required qualified majority in November of this year. 
The key issue that will not go away is the following: Should the prohibition 
of excessive deficits in the Treaty be kept? If the answer is yes, the 
conclusion must be that something like the Stability Pact is needed just to 
make sure that the Treaty is observed. Whatever one might think about the 
fines foreseen in the Stability Pact, peer pressure has been shown not to 
work. If the answer is no, the Stability Pact can indeed be scrapped. But in 
this case one should be honest and also scrap the relevant Treaty provisions. 
The choice should be clear: there can be little doubt that for slow-growth 
economies like Germany and France, the prohibition of excessive deficits 
makes sense. The accelerating ageing of the population will predictably 
increase pressures on health and pension spending in the medium term. In 
order to avoid having to increase taxes even more in the future, this means 
that member countries should start reducing their debt levels as soon as 
possible. There is thus a strong case for the exhortation (it is not more than 
that) contained in the Stability Pact that member countries should aim at a 
balanced budget over the cycle. The 3% limit is thus not only needed, but 
probably already too generous. In sum, there is a strong economic case for 
keeping the prohibition of the 3% limit in the Treaty (see Part II). THE NINE LIVES OF THE STABILITY PACT | 7 
 
Box 2. The day after: Field day for the lawyers … and judges? 
The first point to keep in mind is that what was voted upon in the early morning 
of 26 November 2003 was the wording of Council Conclusions, not a formal 
Council Decision. Although only Council Conclusions, the text included the 
wording: 
  the Council decided not to act, at this point in time, on the basis of the 
Commission Recommendation for a Council decision under Article 
104(9). 
It seems clear that the use of the word “decided” does not change the fact that 
Council Conclusions have no legal value under the excessive deficit procedure 
and that these Conclusions do not constitute a “decision” under Article 104 of 
the Treaty. The Council seems to have taken the position that the matter was thus 
closed (at least for the time being) from a legal point of view. However, it is 
quite clear that the Excessive Deficit Procedure is still valid. The Commission 
entered the following statement into the minutes: “The Commission therefore 
considers that the Council recommendations based on Article 104(7) remain in 
force”.  
The legal point is that Article 104(13) specified clearly that when taking 
decisions in these matters “the Council shall act on a recommendation from the 
Commission”. What happens when the Council acts by not taking a formal 
decision (only adopting Council Conclusions) and in the absence of a 
recommendation is not quite clear.  
What is clear, however, is that there is a potential for a serious legal and political 
conflict between the two key institutions of the EU, the Commission and the 
Council. Legal specialists can now argue endlessly whether the Council 
“Decision” of November 25 was arrived at using proper procedures and whether 
it brings the Excessive Deficit Procedure back to the previous stage, etc… An 
additional point that will need to be clarified is whether Council Conclusions 
could be adopted with only the eurozone countries voting (as was the case). 
Some of these questions might be resolved by the Court of Justice, but the Court 
will not be able to solve the fundamental problem that the Treaty does not 
specify what happens if the recommendation from the Commission does not find 
the required qualified majority. 
The announcement of the Commission that it will ask the European Court of 
Justice to rule on the question whether the ECOFIN Council used the proper 
procedure in issuing its Council Conclusions on November 25-26 attracted a lot 
of attention and was seen by many as unprecedented. However, legal battles 
between the Commission and the Council are in reality quite frequent. Every 
year the European Court of Justice has to rule on several cases between the 
Commission and the Council. The latest one, to give just one example, 
concerned the procedure used by the Council in arriving at a decision concerning 
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2.  How did we get there? The excessive deficit procedure in 
action 
It pays to revisit the chain of events that led to the controversial ECOFIN 
decision(s) of November 25 (see Box 3 for the legal background). The case 
of Germany is perhaps the most interesting. Formally it started in January 
2003, when the budget numbers for the year 2002 could be considered final 
and it turned out that the 2002 deficit had been widely above the 3% of GDP 
limit in the Treaty. As nothing indicated that this would be ‘temporary’, the 
ECOFIN had no choice but to take note of this fact and start the excessive 
deficit procedure against Germany under Article 104(2-4) of the Treaty.
1 
Once the EDP has started, the country concerned has to show how the 
excessive deficit will be corrected (Article 104(2-7) of the Treaty). Germany 
thus agreed in early 2003 to a Council recommendation
2 to reduce its deficit 
during the year 2003 to 2.75%. This was made explicitly conditional on 
growth reaching 1.5% because it had become clear by early 2003 that the 
growth projections for the year were based on shaky foundations. The 
general commitment in terms of the overall budget balance, which was also 
equivalent to a reduction in the (cyclically adjusted) deficit of 1% of GDP, 
was made more concrete in a series of measures that were supposed to reach 
this goal. The German authorities also promised (see Council Conclusions of 
21 January 2003 in Annex 4) that they would avoid taking “discretionary 
measures that could aggravate the budgetary position” and that the deficit 
would go below 3% of GDP in 2004. All of these promises were 
subsequently broken. France had similar obligations imposed upon it, but 
these were formally decided only in June (see Annex 5). 
In May 2003, the Commission made public its assessment of Germany’s 
compliance record: 
                                                 
1 As background, it is also important to note that one year earlier (in January 
2002), the German authorities had averted receiving an ‘early warning’ that the 
deficit was heading towards the 3% limit by issuing a solemn promise that it 
would “endeavour to ensure” that the limit was not breached.  
2 See Annex 4. This document also contains the following passages: “The 
Council regrets that it has proven not to be possible for the German authorities to 
fulfil their commitment of 12 February 2002 … The Council notes that the rise 
in the nominal deficit from 2001 to 2002 cannot be explained only by the 
unexpected slowdown in growth and that there have once more been expenditure 
overruns in the health sector …” THE NINE LIVES OF THE STABILITY PACT | 9 
 
Based on currently available information, it is our assessment 
that the consolidation impact of the implemented measures is 
likely to reach the required 1% of GDP.
3 
In November of the same year, the assessment suddenly changed. The 2003 
autumn forecast projected the German deficit on a cyclically adjusted basis 
to run at 3.6% of GDP; one full percentage point more than estimated in 
April of the same year (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Estimate of cyclically adjusted, general government balances 
(as a percentage of GDP) for the year 2003 
 IV-2002  XI-2002  III-2003  X-2003 
Germany -1.9  -2.4  -2.6  -3.5 
France -1.9  -2.8  -3.5 -3.9 
Source: Autumn 2003 forecast of the European Commission. 
One might be tempted to argue (as do the German authorities) that this 
deterioration had been due to the lower-than-expected growth. But this 
should have been captured by the cyclical adjustment of the deficit; the 
deterioration thus appears to have come on top of the effects of the growth 
slowdown. For France, one can observe a similar surprise: more than one full 
percentage point deterioration between the time the budget for 2003 was 
known (end of 2002) and the latest forecast. 
Box 3. The excessive deficit procedure in the Treaty 
The excessive deficit procedure (indeed a rather complicated procedure) can be 
broken down into a number of discrete steps, the first four of which form one 
group and were not really contentious in this case: 
Step 1: ‘If a member state does not fulfil the requirements under one or both of 
these criteria, the Commission shall prepare a report’ (104c(3)).  
Step 2: The Monetary Committee (which will be called differently in EMU) 
‘shall formulate an opinion on the report of the Commission’ (104c(4)).  
Step 3: ‘If the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a member state 
exists or may occur, the Commission shall address its opinion to the Council’ 
(104c(5)).  
Step 4 is the decisive one: ‘The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a 
recommendation from the Commission . . . decide after an overall assessment 
whether an excessive deficit exists’ (104c(6)) . 
In the case of both France and Germany, there could not be, and never was, any 
contention of the fact that an excessive deficit does exist. But the more 
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interesting question is: What happens once the (ECOFIN) Council has found that 
an excessive deficit exists?  
Step 5 follows: ‘the Council shall make recommendations to the member state 
concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given period’ 
(104c(7)). (This is what happened in early 2003.) If the country follows its 
recommendations, that is the end of the procedure. If not, 
Step 6 is next: ‘Where it establishes that there has been no effective action in 
response to its recommendations within the period laid down, the Council may 
make its recommendations public’ (104c(8)). This provision is already obsolete, 
since most member countries decided on their own to publish the 
recommendations of the first (non-binding) excessive deficit exercise held in 
1994. Since the mere publication of recommendations cannot be expected to 
produce results, 
Step 7 follows: ‘If a member state persists in failing to put into practice the 
recommendations of the Council, the Council may decide to give notice to the 
member state to take, within a specified time limit, measures for the deficit 
reduction which is judged necessary by the Council in order to remedy the 
situation’ (104c(9)). One of the Commission’s recommendations for November 
25 concerned this article. It is usually overlooked that the recourse to this article 
does not automatically imply sanctions because this ultimate enforcement 
mechanism comes only later: 
As long as a member state fails to comply with a decision taken in accordance 
with paragraph 9, the Council may decide to apply or, as the case may be, 
intensify one or more of the following measures: 
-  to require that the member state concerned shall publish additional 
information, to be specified by the Council, before issuing bonds and 
securities; 
-  to invite the European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending policy 
towards the member state concerned; 
-  to require that the member state concerned makes a non-interest-bearing 
deposit of an appropriate size with the Community until the excessive deficit 
has, in the view of the Council, been corrected; 
-  to impose fines of an appropriate size. 
-  The President of the Council shall inform the European Parliament about the 
decision taken. 
If the Commission’s recommendation had been accepted on November 25, 
sanctions could thus have been imposed on France and Germany only in case 
they had not complied with this recommendation. Thus, the provisions of the 
Stability Pact would have come into play only later in detailing what sanctions 
would have to be imposed on Germany and France if they had been found (say, 
in early 2004) not to have complied with the Commission’s recommendation. THE NINE LIVES OF THE STABILITY PACT | 11 
 
3.  Problems with the lynchpin of the EDP: Budget forecasting 
This confusing succession of budget plans that were never implemented 
shows a deeper problem: An essential element of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure is that budgets (in the sense of planned expenditure and receipts of 
the general government during the year) must be realistic. The key institution 
in this respect should be the Commission, which is supposed to be the neutral 
arbiter who checks the budget plans presented by member countries for their 
reliability. Without realistic budgets, the Treaty provisions against excessive 
deficits become unenforceable. Events during 2003 suggest that the 
Commission has encountered difficulties to perform this aspect of its general 
task as the “Guardian of the Treaty”.  
At first sight, it is difficult to understand how this succession of surprises 
came about. Germany is a particularly interesting case: After all, at the 
beginning of 2003, Germany gave a solemn undertaking that it would take 
the appropriate measures to keep its deficit for 2003 under control after 
having breached the 3% limit already during 2002. Little noticed by the 
outside world, Germany was given by ECOFIN until May 2003 to 
implement a series of measures designed to keep its deficit under control. 
This deadline passed and the Commission and ECOFIN were apparently 
satisfied that Germany had actually done what it promised and that hence the 
budget for 2003 would be under control. As we now know, this was not the 
case.  
If one looks more closely at how cyclically adjusted deficits are produced, it 
appears that part of this error is due to the way in which the cyclical 
adjustment is calculated for Germany. During 2003, the growth prospects of 
Germany had to be considerably revised downward (again), because the 
actual growth rate had been much below what had been anticipated earlier. 
For most of the other member countries, one more year of a growth 
disappointment would not have mattered much for the estimate of the longer-
term growth prospects, but in the case of Germany the Council had actually 
more or less forced the Commission to use a particular statistical technique 
which had this effect.
4 See also Box 4 for more details on how cyclically 
adjusted deficits are calculated. 
 
 
                                                 
4 In 2002, the Council had in effect instructed the Commission to use the so-
called HP filter to estimate the potential growth rate, and hence the output gap 
for Germany. For almost all other member countries, the so-called production 
function technique is used, which reacts somewhat less to current data (but has 
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Box 4. The cyclically adjusted deficit: A moving target 
To understand cyclical adjustment to budget balances, assume that in the absence 
of fiscal policy changes government revenues change in proportion to nominal 
GDP, and that government expenditures vary in proportion to nominal potential 
GDP. These assumptions reflect the view that government revenues are 
influenced by cyclical variations of GDP, while expenditures vary only little. 
Hence, the cyclical component of government deficits depends on the difference 
between actual and potential GDP, that is, the so-called output gap. When the 
latter is zero, the cyclical budget balance would be zero as well. When the output 
gap is positive (potential above actual GDP), there would be a cyclical deficit; 
when it is negative, there would be a cyclical surplus. 
In Euroland, the share of government revenues and expenditures in GDP is close 
to 50%. Hence, if actual nominal GDP is 1% above potential nominal GDP – 
implying a negative output gap of 1% of GDP – cyclical effects raise revenue by 
0.5% above expenditures. Thus, the cyclical component of the government’s 
budget balance would be 0.5% of GDP. This calculation can be simplified by 
applying the “elasticity” of government revenue to actual GDP – in the above 
case 0.5% – directly to the output gap. To arrive at the structural deficit, the 
cyclical component – calculated as the product of output gap and revenue 
‘elasticity’ – is then subtracted from the actual deficit. 
In practice, elasticities of revenues and expenditures with respect to cyclical 
variations of GDP – and hence the elasticity of the cyclical budget balance with 
respect to the output gap – are estimated or calibrated rather than simply 
assumed. The European Commission estimates the revenue elasticity at 0.4 and 
the expenditure elasticity at - 0.1, giving an output gap elasticity of 0.5. Hence, 
the Commission’s results are broadly in line with those of the simple procedure 
described above. In its autumn forecast, the Commission estimated the actual 
Euroland budget balance at 2.8% of GDP. At the same time, it estimated the 
output gap for 2003 at 1.2%. Using an elasticity of the cyclical budget balance 
with respect to the output gap of 0.5, the cyclical component of the deficit was 
put at about 0.5%. The structural deficit was therefore estimated at 2.3% of GDP. 
Estimating cyclical components of government budget balances is subject to 
three possible forecast errors: First, the output gap may be incorrectly estimated, 
because of either a forecasting error for actual GDP or for potential GDP. 
Second, the actual budget balance may be projected incorrectly. Third, the output 
gap elasticity may be wrong. In its forecast revisions this autumn, the 
Commission changed its estimates for both the actual deficit and potential GDP 
growth (and hence the output gap). Criticism of the Commission’s estimate of 
Germany’s structural deficit has focused on the assumed elasticities. German 
government officials and observers have argued that especially the 
Commission’s estimate has been too low for the elasticity of government 
spending with respect to cyclical effects. THE NINE LIVES OF THE STABILITY PACT | 13 
 
Because the economic weakening has been longer and shallower than usual, it 
has been argued that the government has incurred larger cyclically-induced 
spending increases on unemployment compensation than in the past. The drop in 
employment during the recent episode of weakness was even stronger than 
during the 1993 recession, while the output gap (as estimated by the 
Commission) did not increase by as much. Hence, it has been argued that 
cyclical spending rose by more than in the past in response to the output gap. 
The cyclical component of the German government budget deficit would 
therefore be larger – and the structural component smaller – than estimated by 
the Commission. 
In our view, the – now rather low – potential growth estimates for Germany that 
the Commission has produced under the procedure imposed by the Council 
actually reflect more accurately reality than the still rather optimistic estimates 
that are used for other member countries. As explained below, the continuing 
overestimate of the long-term growth potential had been one of the key driving 
factors behind the current problems with fiscal policy. 
The key fact that remains, however, is that this extraordinary derapage 
surfaced only a couple of months after Germany was essentially certified as 
having brought its budget under control. We have considered also more 
systematically the performance of the budget forecasts of the Commission 
(see Box 4), which reveals that the errors in budgetary forecasting are so 
large systemically that it becomes clear that the Commission simply does not 
have adequate resources to forecast budgetary balances. Even within-the-
year forecasts have a margin of error not much less than 1% of GDP.  
This very large forecast error has a serious implication: the Stability Pact is 
becoming unenforceable. This conclusion is already difficult to avoid under a 
simple technicality: The German authorities have actually done more or less 
what they promised to do. Once they do that, the rules of the Stability Pact 
imply that no further steps can be undertaken against the offender. The 
founders of the Stability Pact (and the drafters of the Treaty) envisaged fines 
being imposed on the country in question after it failed to undertake the steps 
it was required to take by ECOFIN in formal recommendations. What no one 
apparently anticipated was that the country could take all the required 
measures and still see its budget deteriorating (even on a cyclically adjusted 
basis).  
The inability to predict budgets with any precision also implies that the 
promises that France and Germany made concerning their budgets for 2005 
or even 2006 are of little value. In spring 2002, the Commission’s forecast 
for the German deficit for 2003 was 1.9%, whereas the end result is 2 full 
percentage points higher (to repeat: the lower-than-expected growth does not 
matter here because these are cyclically adjusted deficits). For France the 
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whether France should agree to plan for 2004 an improvement of 0.7% (as 
proposed by the French) or 1% (as apparently requested by the Commission). 
The outcome is likely to be much worse anyway. As for the longer-term 
promises, one can only conclude that a promise by either France or Germany 
to go under the 3% limit by 2006 means that by that time the deficit might 
actually be closer to 5% than to 3% of GDP. 
We have so far concentrated on a particular case, namely Germany. But was 
this case exceptional? In other words: How accurate are the Commission’s 
budget forecasts in general? 
Any statistical analysis of the Commission’s forecasts for the budget deficits 
of euro area countries can only be made on a preliminary basis, since the 
sample period is so short. In our analysis we used all the forecasts published 
by the Commission from the spring of 1998 to the autumn of 2003, regarding 
two variables: the non-cyclically adjusted budget deficits and, from the 
spring of 1999 to the autumn of 2003, the cyclically adjusted budget deficits.  
Our main findings are: 
1.  Across the 12 member countries of the euro area, the average standard 
error of these forecasts is rather high. It depends on the forecast horizon, 
but it is never much below 1% of GDP (see table below). This implies 
that the spring forecast for the current year has a more than 1 in 3 chance 
of being off by one full percentage point of GDP. (For example, a 
forecast deficit of 2% of GDP might turn out to be either 1 or 3% of 
GDP with a probability of about 33%.) However, we also find that there 
are large differences across member countries. The budgets of some 
countries were apparently much harder to predict than others (the highest 
standard deviation was five times the lowest). 
Table 2. Unweighted averages of the Commission's forecast errors for 
national budget deficits in the euro area, at different forecasting 
horizons 
   Non-cyclically adjusted  Cyclically adjusted 
   Bias  Standard 
deviation  Bias  Standard 
deviation 
1  quarter  ahead  -0.10 0.79  -0.64 0.78 
3  quarter  ahead  -0.13 1.05  -0.72 1.03 
5  quarter  ahead  -0.15 1.06  -0.92 0.81 
7  quarter  ahead  -0.09 1.45  -0.84 1.23 
Note: The sample includes forecast errors from 1999 to 2002, except in the case of the 5 
and 7 quarters ahead forecasts for cyclically adjusted deficits, which are not 
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2.  The non-cyclically adjusted deficits are actually more accurate than the 
cyclically adjusted deficits in the sense that the cyclically adjusted 
deficits were on average underestimated by about 0.7% of GDP over the 
period 1999-2002 (and on average across the 12 euro area member 
countries). This is probably due to the fact that the Commission (along 
with many others) has constantly overestimated actual (and potential) 
growth over this period. This is another illustration of the importance of 
recognising the trend growth slowdown Europe emphasised in previous 
reports (see Gros et al., 2001, 2002 and 2003). 
Regarding the forecast horizon, it is not surprising that we also find that 
shorter-term forecasts have a much higher precision. The standard error of 
the estimates seven to five quarters ahead is higher than that of one to three 
quarters ahead.  
The purpose of the Treaty is not to punish countries, but to prevent the 
emergence of excessive deficits. This is why budgets for the current year and 
the future play such a central role in the excessive deficit procedure (and the 
Stability Pact). If the Treaty is ever to be applied properly, the quality of 
budget forecasting by the Commission must be improved. To this end, the 
Commission must be given more resources and early warning systems must 
be strengthened. 
4. What  next? 
King Pyrrhus is reported to have exclaimed “one more such victory and I am 
lost”, while counting his losses after a victory against tenacious Roman 
legions. This thought must also have occurred to the leaders of France and 
Germany when they surveyed the battlefield after November 25th. The 
political price for their ‘victory’ over the Commission is now apparent and it 
is destined to mount over time. The position of the German government was 
widely criticised in Germany and the widespread impression that the larger 
member countries are exempt from the rules of the Treaty certainly had a 
strong impact on the discussions within the IGC concerning the draft EU 
Constitution and contributed to the failure of the Brussels summit. The 
position of France and Germany that the smaller countries should give up 
part of their voting powers in a future Constitution now encounters 
constantly the argument that the small countries should retain a large voting 
power because they are the only ones that can be relied upon to uphold the 
Treaty. 
As explained above, the ‘victory’ is short-lived: France and Germany are 
now obliged to report back to the Council in early 2004 and have to show 
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decision of November 25.
5 If they fail in this, they will again have to put 
pressure on other member countries to vote in their favour. 
Another problem is destined to emerge after the accession of the ten new 
member countries. Some of them are likely to push for early membership in 
the euro area. Hungary, for example, has announced its ambition to join the 
euro area as quickly as possible, although it still has a fiscal deficit above the 
3% limit and would thus not be eligible under the Maastricht criteria. An 
early and massive enlargement of the euro area is widely perceived as 
undesirable in France and Germany, but until recently it was thought that a 
tough application of the Maastricht criteria would be sufficient to prevent 
this ‘dilution’ of the euro with a large number of poorer countries that still 
need to converge in terms of income per capita. But as long as France and 
Germany fail to submit to the Treaty prohibition of excessive deficits, it will 
become politically untenable to use the same provisions to keep the new 
member states out. 
Both France and Germany thus have a strong political interest in getting out 
of this situation as quickly as possible. As the eurozone recovery is expected 
to be really happening in 2004 (after the false starts in 2002 and 2003), it is 
thus possible that by early 2004 France and Germany will have been able to 
stick to the commitments they undertook on November 25. However, a 
recovery alone is not sufficient as these commitments concern cyclically 
adjusted deficits. The recovery would have to be extraordinarily strong to 
allow France and Germany to go below the 3% limit. 
                                                 
5 King Pyrrhus’ first victory against the Romans was also short-lived. He lost the 
second encounter so decisively that he had to leave Italy forever. | 17 
Part II. Economic Issues 
t has been widely noted that the November 25th debacle did not have any 
direct impact on financial markets: the euro continued to appreciate and 
interest rates did not increase. This absence of a reaction by the markets, 
however, does not imply that limits on fiscal deficits are not needed. On the 
contrary, the lack of a reaction by the markets illustrates actually one of the 
reasons why the excessive deficit procedure was instituted in the first place. 
It was recognised that the reaction of financial markets often comes rather 
late, but then turns quickly into credit rationing. The case of New York City 
is a classic example of this phenomenon: until shortly before it went 
bankrupt, the city had been able to obtain new loans at moderate rates. But 
when its financial problems became apparent, credit was suddenly cut off. 
Thus, the purpose of the excessive deficit procedure (and the Stability Pact) 
thus was, and remains, to ensure that fiscal problems do not accumulate such 
that they become so serious that financial markets (over-)react with credit 
rationing. 
As explained above, the real problem now is how to deal with the refusal of 
France and Germany to abide by the Treaty. The Stability and Growth Pact 
was introduced to ensure that the prohibition of excessive deficits enshrined 
in the Treaty could actually be enforced in practice. The prohibition of 
excessive deficits was specially designed to make fiscal policy sustainable, 
which was clearly needed in view of the rising share of public debt as a 
proportion of GDP year after year during the 1980s and early-to-mid-1990s. 
There is little disagreement over the desirability to stabilise debt/GDP ratios 
at reasonable levels. This is also the reason why the 60% upper limit on debt 
makes sense (although it is difficult to base on an economic model) and is 
not really disputed at the political level…except when the implications for 
current fiscal policy hurt.  
Notwithstanding this general consensus, the central prescription of the SGP – 
namely that governments should aim, over the cycle, at balanced budgets or 
small surpluses – has been subject to a lot of criticism. Many have argued 
that this goal does not make sense because it implies that debt/GDP ratios 
should over time go to zero, which would in general not be the appropriate 
aim for fiscal policy. We will come back to this argument later, after first 
briefly analysing the nature of the present problems with fiscal policy. We 
then turn to the implications of a permanent (as opposed to a cyclical) 
slowdown in growth for fiscal policy. This leads us to the next question: 
What to do when the future threatens to become even more difficult? We 
find that the predictable effects of an ageing population provide a surprising 
rationale for the strictures of the SGP. We then ask whether a one-shot fiscal 
stimulus might nevertheless be useful in kick-starting the economy. We 
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conclude this chapter with a comparison of reaction of fiscal policy to a post-
bubble environment. 
The purpose of this chapter is merely to recall a number of arguments that 
have been known for some time and show how they apply with particular 
force to Europe, and in particular to the case of France and Germany today. 
For a survey of the issues raised by large deficits, see Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City (1995) and, more recently, Rubin et al. (2004). 
1.  Macroeconomic policy and slow growth 
The fiscal problems of France and Germany are widely blamed on the 
prolonged weakness of the economy. But why has growth in Euroland been 
so weak – for so long? It is no longer possible to view this dismal 
performance as a result of external shocks, such as the September 11
th 
terrorist attacks in the US or the Iraq war. The assertion that external shocks 
were the key reason for the weakness of the Euroland economy can be tested 
in a simple way: if it were true, one would expect that small countries would 
be hit stronger than the large countries because the smaller member countries 
have much larger exposure to the rest of the world than the larger members. 
However, the data indicate exactly the contrary. As the table below shows, 
the small euro area countries continued to outperform the ‘big three’ 
(D+F+IT) by a considerable margin during both 2001 and 2002, and this is 
likely to continue for 2003, for which no final data are yet available.  
Table 3. Real growth: Big vs. small economies (%) 
 2001  2002  2003  (est.) 
Big euro-3  1.39  0.59  0.2 
Small euro-8  1.98  1.34  1.2 
Note: Big euro = D+F+IT. Small euro = euro-12 minus D+F+IT+ES. 
Data source: European Commission, AMECO. 
Could one then argue that the weak demand is the result of excessively tight 
monetary and fiscal policy? This also seems difficult to do.  
Regarding monetary policy, the evidence would rather indicate the opposite: 
all the indicators point to an expansionary stance. For example, real interest 
rates are not high by historical standards. After adjusting for HCPI, short-
term inflation rates hover between zero and 1%, much below the longer-term 
averages. The difference between long-term interest rates and inflation is 
also at around 2% – considerably below historical averages and certainly 
much below the values of over 3% reached before EMU started. Moreover, 
the money supply continues to expand at more than 7% per annum, which is 
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liquidity needs. Finally, a number of estimates of the ECB’s reaction 
function indicate that the ECB has broadly tended to follow economic 
developments in much the same way as one would expect from other central 
banks and in particular the US Federal Reserve. 
Fiscal policy also cannot be blamed. Fiscal policy has actually been broadly 
expansionary – at least if one takes into account the fact that cyclically 
adjusted deficits have increased over the last years, from 1.9% of GDP in 
2000, to 2.3% in 2001 and 2.4% in 2002. If one adheres to the view that a 
higher deficit actually leads to stronger demand, one would have to conclude 
that over the last three years fiscal policy actually provided a small positive 
impulse.  
It is interesting to note that the difference between small and large countries 
can also be seen in terms of fiscal policy. For some time now, the smaller 
euro area countries have consistently had lower deficits, but this does not 
seem to have had a negative impact on their growth prospects as documented 
in Table 3 above. 
The fact that the high fiscal deficits of the larger member countries have 
apparently not stimulated growth should also induce one to reflect again on 
the fundamental issue of whether higher deficits actually lead to stronger 
demand. A number of academic publications show that the more recent 
evidence suggests that higher deficits do not necessarily stimulate demand 
(see Gros et al., 2002 and 2003 and references therein). 
It is interesting to note that the scepticism of the academic economists seems 
to be shared by the population (although politicians are still professing 
Keynesian views). Recent opinion polls in Germany asked people whether 
they would start spending more if the government were to anticipate a 
reduction in taxes. The answers (see Annex 6 for details) are revealing: 
between 80% and 90% of consumers indicate that they would not increase 
their spending in response to a lowering of taxes. This makes it difficult to 
believe the claim of the German government that it had to embark on this 
route (tax cutting in 2004) in order to avoid endangering the recovery. 
2.  The interest costs of higher deficits 
In 1985-95 – before EMU was a realistic prospect – euro area deficits 
averaged 4.7% of GDP. In 1996-2004, they are likely to average 2.2% of 
GDP. Hence, one can calculate that the pressure for fiscal discipline 
emanating from the Maastricht criteria and the SGP has reduced the longer-
term average of the Euroland budget deficit ratio by some 2.5% of GDP. 
Economic theory and experience suggest that a return to the times of fiscal 
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spending for Euroland governments. How strong would be this effect? It 
might be useful to turn to the models used by financial market institutions. 
For example, according to Deutsche Bank’s bond yield model (DByield), an 
increase in the Euroland budget deficit ratio by 1 percentage point raises 
long-term government bond yields by 24 basis points. Moreover, the ECB 
has indicated that it would have to follow a tighter monetary policy in the 
absence of fiscal discipline. Hence, a return to the fiscal policies of 1985-95 
– implying a sustained increase of 2.5% of GDP in the deficit ratio from the 
2002 level – could raise interest rates on government debt by 0.60 percentage 
points across the yield curve. Based on our estimate of the average maturity 
of Euroland government debt, it would take about four years from now until 
the new rate would apply to the entire stock of debt. Thus, assuming nominal 
GDP growth of 4% per year in 2003-07 and an increase in the deficit ratio 
from 2.2% of GDP in 2002 to 4.7% in 2007, annual debt service payments 
could increase by €37 billion or 0.6% of GDP by 2007. We wish to 
emphasise that the numbers presented here are actually at the lower end of 
the spectrum of the available estimates. For example, Rubin et al. (2004) 
argue that a 1% increase in the deficit ratio (in the US) should lead to an 
increase in interest rates of between 30 and 30 basis points. Applied to the 
case of the eurozone, this would imply that the increase in interest rates 
might be between 0.75 and 1.5 percentage points so that the increase in 
interest rate expenditure would easily reach 1% percentage of GDP. 
3.  Implications of lower growth for fiscal policy 
One key assumption of the Maastricht Treaty had been that a deficit of 3% of 
GDP would be the maximum that member countries could allow themselves 
if they wanted to keep debt levels under control. We question this 
assumption below, but first we want to ask why a number of member 
countries are breaching the 3% deficit ceiling at present. Governments are 
claiming that it is not their fault, that their economies are the victims of an 
unfavourable business cycle. In our view, this is overly optimistic. As 
documented above (see also CEPS, 2003, for more detail), the potential 
growth rate of the eurozone is declining, due primarily to the fact that 
productivity growth has slowed to a snail’s pace in Europe (while it has 
accelerated in the US).  
Productivity is a slow-moving variable and the exact numbers are available 
only after a delay of several years. There can nevertheless be little doubt that 
productivity growth is now significantly lower than it was 10 years ago, 
when the Maastricht Treaty was signed. During the 15 years leading up to 
1990, labour-productivity growth had been increasing annually at 2.3%. 
Over the 1990s, this measure of productivity has decelerated and is now 
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Moreover, there is no reason to hope for a quick rebound (as happened in the 
US over the 1990s). 
Most policy-makers are loathe to admit that potential growth may have 
declined. They maintain that all one has to do is to wait for growth to get 
back to its full potential, which they estimate to be growing at over 2.5% per 
annum. A modest 1.2-1.8% might be a more realistic target, however, 
especially for the larger eurozone member countries.
6 
The decline in potential growth has two immediate implications for fiscal 
policy: 
i)  A first implication of lower growth is that many estimates of structural 
balances are too low. Given that the share of general government in GDP 
is around 50%, every percentage point of lower potential growth implies 
an overestimate of structural balances by 0.5% of GDP. If potential 
growth is in reality 1.5% p.a., or one percentage point lower than the 
officially assumed figure of 2.5%, then the ‘excessive’ deficits of 
Germany in 2002 and 2003 would have to be regarded as almost totally 
structural and not cyclical, as is often assumed. The German example is 
particularly instructive as this is also the country with the lowest 
estimates of potential growth. For example, Germany’s deficit for 2002 
amounted to about 3.7% of GDP. During that year, growth in Germany 
was only about 0.5%. It is thus not surprising that the Commission’s 
estimate of the structural deficit of Germany in 2002 was 3.2% of GDP. 
The data for 2003 are broadly similar (but a bit worse). The excessive 
deficits of Germany are thus clearly not due to a weak business cycle, 
but to a structural weakness of fiscal policy.  
ii)  A second implication of lower potential growth pertains to the 
sustainability of debt levels. If potential growth is as low as 1.5% and if 
the ECB achieves an average inflation rate of 1.5%, the maximum 
allowable deficit to keep public debt at 60% of GDP is only 1.8% of 
GDP (not the 3% as assumed under Maastricht parameters). Again, the 
German example is instructive in this respect. If Germany were to 
continue with its structural deficit of close to 3%, its debt-to-GDP ratio 
would soon start to rise and would eventually stop only at 100% of GDP. 
The very low productivity growth in Europe thus imposes some hard 
constraints on fiscal policy that have not been sufficiently recognised so far. 
Policy-makers should face up to this problem and stop blaming an 
anonymous global business cycle. 
                                                 
6 See, for example, “Euroland: Assessing Potential Growth”, Global Markets 
Research, Deutsche Bank, 1 October 2003. 22 | SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
As noted above, it is mainly the large countries that have a problem with 
fiscal policy. All three ‘large’ eurozone countries (France, Germany and 
Italy) are currently violating or close to violating their commitments, 
whereas most of the small countries (with the notable exception of Portugal) 
have been able to stick to their commitments. The reason for this is quite 
clear. The eight ‘virtuous’ small eurozone countries were able to cut 
expenditure on average by around 1.5% of GDP over the last three years, 
whereas the three large members (and the sinner Portugal) were not able to 
manage even one-third of this. It is thus not surprising that the deficits are 
under control in the smaller eurozone countries. It seems that the body politic 
of the smaller countries has been quicker to realise the merit of meeting their 
obligations under the Stability Pact. 
Many US observers have dismissed the 3% deficit of the Maastricht Treaty 
as arbitrary and useless. This position might be coloured by the quite 
different experience of the US, which in our view is also justified by the 
more promising long-term growth prospects of the US economy. The US is 
poised to grow substantially faster than the EU (and in particular the 
eurozone) economy not only because its productivity growth is now much 
higher, but also because its working age population is certain to increase 
whereas that of the EU is certain to stagnate over the next ten years and then 
likely to actually start falling. These two factors together imply that the 
growth differential between the US and the EU might be around two full 
percentage points per annum. This discrepancy has huge implications for the 
sustainability of fiscal policy. Table 4 shows what combinations of growth 
and trend deficits would lead to what steady state debt level. 
Table 4. Steady state debt levels (as % of GDP) 
Cyclically adjusted deficit 
in % of GDP 
 
2% 3% 4% 5% 
Germany: 1.5%  57  86  114  143 
EU today (?): 2%  50  75  100  125 
Maastricht: 3%  40  60  80 100 
Trend growth 
of real GDP 
in % p.a. 
US  today  (?):  4%  33 50 67 83 
Source: Own calculations. The calculations assume an inflation rate of 2% so that nominal 
GDP growth is 2 percentage points higher than the real rates indicated in the first 
column. 
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Table 4 shows that for a slow-growth economy such as Germany even a 
deficit of only 2% of GDP that persisted over the cycle would barely keep 
the debt-to-GDP ratio close to the 60% limit. Continuing deficits of 4% of 
GDP by all member countries would bring the EU debt ratio to 100% of 
GDP. The contrast between Germany and the US is particularly striking. The 
latter could run indefinitely deficits about twice as high (4% of GDP) and 
still end up with a similar debt ratio (67% of GDP).  
4.  Even leaner times ahead? 
We have so far argued that the lean years (in terms of low productivity 
growth) are here to stay and that this provides a reason to restrict deficits in 
order to prevent the debt-to-GDP ratios from increasing. But there are 
reasons to assume that the environment for fiscal policy will become even 
more challenging over the next decades.  
The basic reason is the accelerating aging of the population throughout 
Euroland, which implies additional burdens on public expenditure because of 
an increase in pensions (people live longer) and health expenditure.  
Basic economic theory suggests that a sound fiscal policy should set tax rates 
today not only on the basis of current expenditure needs, but also on those 
expenditures that can be expected in the future. This is called ‘tax-
smoothing’. The standard arguments for tax-smoothing suggest that one 
should prepare for the increase in expenditure from ageing by saving already 
today (or rather by accumulating less public debt today). This provides 
another argument why the goal of the SGP, to have public sector balances 
close to equilibrium, or in surplus, on average, over the cycle, might be 
appropriate for most Euroland countries for the next few decades (see CEPS, 
2003, for more details). 
The general argument for tax-smoothing is quite clear: ideally one should 
keep tax rates as constant as possible and prepare for future increased 
expenditure by generating surpluses today. What are the magnitudes? We 
start from the assumption that deficits should still be bound by the limit of 
3% of GDP in the far future when the demographic profile has stabilised. 
The next step in determining how ageing should influence fiscal policy today 
is to estimate the additional fiscal burden that it engenders. A careful analysis 
has recently been provided by the 2003 report of the Commission on Public 
Finances in EMU (European Commission, 2003). The main conclusion of 
this analysis is that the ageing that one can already foresee today with 
considerable certainty implies an additional net burden for public finances of 
around 3-5% of GDP. Taking into account the 3% limit for the future, this 
leads to a very simple conclusion: If tax rates are to be held roughly constant 
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should run budgets today that should be between balance and a 2% surplus, 
which is exactly as foreseen by the Stability and Growth Pact.  
This leads us to the following conclusion: It may be difficult to make the 
argument that a balanced budget over the cycle is always the best choice 
because this would lead to the public debt level dropping to zero as a 
percentage of GDP. In the specific situation of most eurozone member 
countries, however, which have to confront the burden of a rapidly ageing 
population, it would be advisable to prepare for the future by running a fiscal 
policy today that allows countries to avoid excessive increases in tax rates. It 
turns out that estimates of the fiscal cost of ageing imply that the fiscal 
policy needed today is approximately what is prescribed by the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Balanced budgets (or actually small surpluses) would in this 
view be needed ‘only’ during the transition to the new steady state in 
demographic terms, i.e. according to most projections until around 2020.  
Prudent fiscal policy today is not a question of adhering to a rigid rule, but 
rather ensuring the sustainability of fiscal policy for the future. 
5.  A false excuse: Payments to the EU budget 
Representatives of the German government like to point out that that 
Germany is the largest net payer to the EU and is therefore entitled to some 
preferential treatment. This argument cannot be used in the context of the 
excessive deficit procedure, however, for the simple reason that the net 
contribution of Germany to the EU budget cannot be held responsible for the 
ever-increasing German deficits. As Table 5 below shows, the net 
contribution of Germany to the EU’s budget has actually declined 
continuously in recent years to reach only 0.24% of Germany’s GDP. At the 
same time the fiscal deficit of Germany increased to around 4% of GDP. 
Germany would thus breach the 3% Treaty ceiling even if it was not a net 
contributor to the EU budget. 
Table 5. National net payments to the EU budget, by the big three euro area 
countries, 1999-2002 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 
Germany -0.44 -0.42 -0.34 -0.24 
France 0.00  -0.05  -0.14  -0.14 
Italy -0.07  0.11  -0.17  -0.23 
Source: European Commission (2003). 
It is true that some smaller member countries (and also Spain) receive 
substantial net transfers from the EU. Except for the minor element of the 
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the recipients. Most of these transfers come in the form of structural funds 
which typically require at least 50% co-financing from the host country’s 
public sector. This implies that for a country like Spain, which is a net 
beneficiary of the EU budget of over 1% of GDP, the net impact of the 
inflows of structural funds on its budget is likely to be close to zero, and 
might even be negative. 
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Part III. What to do? 
ur economic analysis shows that the upper limit of 3% of GDP for 
fiscal deficits should now even be considered as generous, given the 
low long-term growth potential of the EU’s economy. We would 
therefore not advocate any change in the Treaty provisions concerning the 
prohibition of excessive deficits. Our political analysis has shown that France 
and Germany are starting to perceive that their apparent obstruction of the 
Treaty carries a higher political cost. In our view the Commission has 
therefore perhaps lost one battle, but not necessarily the war.  
The key question now is how to make the enforcement mechanism work. 
The main practical problem in this respect is that any efficient enforcement 
mechanism requires accurate budget forecasting. If one can determine 
deficits only several months after the year has finished, it is impossible to 
prevent excessive deficits. This suggests that early warnings should be issued 
well in advance. This will make it possible to avoid further crises and 
breaches of the Treaty and the SGP. Unfortunately, however, the data for 
France and Germany presented above as an example show large errors in 
forecasting budget deficits. 
In this part we first show how the uncertainty surrounding budget forecasting 
could be explicitly recognised while still providing an objective criterion for 
deciding whether to issue an early warning. We then turn to the question of 
how the uncertainty in forecasting could be reduced. 
1.  Early warnings: Recognising uncertainty in budget forecasts 
The early warning system is the appropriate instrument to take this inherent 
uncertainty into account. The purpose of an early warning is not to punish a 
member state, but to serve notice that there is a considerable chance that the 
3% deficit ceiling will be breached. Our statistical analysis suggests a simple 
approach that could be easily implemented: The Commission could construct 
confidence intervals for three and five quarters-ahead forecasts and issue 
early warnings whenever the lower end of the confidence band indicates with 
a certain probability that the deficit will be higher than 3%. 
Table 6 shows confidence intervals based simply on the average standard 
errors that we calculated on the basis of past experience. We assumed that 
there is no difference across countries in terms of the precision of the 
forecasts. In technical terms this implies that we used the same standard 
deviation for all countries. In a practical application, and once the 
Commission has been given the additional resources we argue it needs, it 
might be possible to discriminate between member countries in terms of the 
risks involved in their stability programmes. 
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Table 6. Lower bands for confidence intervals for the Commission's 
forecasts, using half of one standard deviation 
3-quarter ahead ‘warnings’ based on confidence intervals 
for 3-quarters ahead forecasts (Ft+3,t) 
(spring forecasts for the same year) 
   F2000,2000-S F 2001,2001-S F 2002,2002-S F 2003,2003-S F 2004,2004-S 
Belgium -1.0  0.1  -0.7 -0.7 - 
Fr/Germany -1.5 -2.2 -3.3 -3.9 - 
Greece -1.8  -0.5  -0.2 -1.6 - 
Spain -1.2  -0.4  -0.7 -0.9 - 
France -2.0  -1.1  -2.4 -4.2 - 
Ireland 1.2  3.4  0.1 -1.1 - 
Italy -2.0  -1.8  -1.8 -2.8 - 
Netherlands 0.5 0.3  -0.5 -2.1 - 
Austria -2.2  -1.2  -0.6 -1.6 - 
Portugal -2.0  -2.0  -3.1 -4.0 - 
Finland 3.6  4.8  2.8 2.8 - 
5-quarter ahead ‘warnings’ based on confidence intervals 
for 5-quarters ahead forecasts (Ft+5,t) 
(autumn forecasts of the previous year) 
   F2000,1999-A F 2001,2000-A F 2002,2001-A F 2003,2002-A F2004,2003-A
Belgium -1.2  0.2  -0.7 -0.5 -0.9
Fr/Germany -1.7 -2.0 -3.2 -3.6 -4.4
Greece -2.1  -0.8  -0.2 -1.6 -2.9
Spain -1.3  -0.4  -0.7 -0.8 -0.4
France -2.2  -0.5  -2.5 -3.4 -4.3
Ireland 2.6  4.0  1.3 -1.7 -1.7
Italy -2.2  -1.6  -1.7 -2.7 -3.3
Netherlands -0.6 0.1 0.0 -1.7 -3.2
Austria  -3.1  -1.3 -0.9 -2.1 -1.1
Portugal -1.7  -1.9  -2.1 -3.4 -3.8
Finland 3.6  3.9  2.4 2.6 1.2
Note: Intervals are constructed using the average standard deviation shown in Table 2 
above. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
We report the lower bound (the higher deficit) using a band of one half of 
one standard deviation because under certain technical assumptions (normal 
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government net balance will be lower than the lower bound is approximately 
30%. This exercise should serve as a sufficiently strict interpretation of the 
Stability Pact, which stipulates that an early warning should be issued “in 
order to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit” (Article 6.2).  
How would our system have worked? If the Commission had used our 
calculations, it would have given an early warning to France in the autumn of 
2002 (as opposed to early 2003). In the case of Germany, the early warning 
would have come in the autumn of 2001, which would have had the 
advantage of giving the German government more time to take action before 
the election campaign had started in 2002. But this was not done, and by 
early 2002, it turned out that the election was so close that it was politically 
impossible to deliver an early warning to the government at that stage. Our 
approach would thus have been a useful and objectively based guide for 
these two countries to take early action. 
But this method would not have been foolproof as it would have failed to 
trigger an early warning to Portugal before the spring of 2002. In any case, it 
would have been very difficult to predict the Portuguese budgetary slippage 
in 2001, because there were problems in the reporting of the data by this 
country.  
Notice that our method would also have triggered early warnings to Italy and 
to the Netherlands in 2003, regarding their budget deficits in 2004. The 
estimated lower band for Greece in 2004 is very close to 3%, but given that 
the method already allows for a 70% probability of compliance, it might be 
better to wait and see if the spring forecasts in 2004 reaffirm the need for an 
early warning. 
2. Improving forecasts and applying pressure during good 
times 
In our view Germany and France are likely to realise that it is not in their 
interest to run excessive deficits for the foreseeable future. Moreover, even 
the contested ECOFIN decision of November 25 provided a rendezvous for 
early 2004. By that time higher growth might have taken care of at least part 
of the problem, thus allowing these two countries to start following the 
Treaty and applying the Stability Pact. 
But it is crucial that if deficits were to decline below 3% owing to higher-
than-expected growth, that should be no reason for complacency. In fact, the 
fundamental lesson from this episode is that it is very difficult politically to 
implement fiscal consolidation measures during downturns, even if 
technically policy remains countercyclical. Thus, a key aspect of any 
revision of the Stability Pact is to focus on prevention: monitoring and 
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do not worsen their structural fiscal positions during upswings, thereby 
making room for the cyclical increase in nominal deficits that occurs during 
downturns. 
In view of the above, consideration should be given to making two sets of 
improvements:  
•  Enhanced monitoring and forecasting capabilities. This can be 
accomplished by increasing the resources allocated to these functions. At 
present, the Commission sometimes does not even have one full-time 
person to deal only with budget projections. This person then has to rely 
on data and plans provided by the government concerned, which makes 
it difficult to formulate an independent point of view. National 
independent budget agencies in member countries could help in the 
process of arriving at realistic budget projections, if they were similar to 
the Congressional Budget Office in the US, i.e. if they would perform 
independent budget analysis and monitoring. Such independent agencies 
could then also report to the European Commission. Given that 
governments are increasingly allocating budgetary activities to agencies 
beyond the realm of the general government, standard budgetary analysis 
should be accompanied by ‘below the line’ monitoring – that is, debt 
issuance and credit to the government – which would provide a cross-
check to the picture provided by the national accounts and, because of its 
greater frequency, serve as an early warning device. The Commission 
would incorporate the information from these agencies into their 
decision process. 
•  Redesign of the incentive mechanism. The problem with the current 
design of the SGP is that sanctions arrive too late in the process. Peer 
review has been shown not to be effective in precluding pro-cyclical 
policies during upswings, and the threat of financial sanctions arrives too 
late and is not credible. This is a political arrangement, and the cost of 
non-compliance should be political as well. Thus, as a complement to 
the multi-year fiscal planning process, we propose that governments 
commit to testify before their own parliaments following a negative 
report from the Commission. They would be obliged to explain the 
reasons for the slippages with respect to their own medium-term plans 
and the measures that will be taken to remedy the slippages.
7 This would 
increase the government’s ownership of the medium-term plan 
(otherwise the medium-term objectives appear as a requirement coming 
from Brussels, which is not always a popular image) and, if applied from 
                                                 
7 It is very important in this respect that bygones are not allowed to become 
bygones, and that slippages are clawed back promptly and as part of the multi-
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the very beginning of the process, could prevent pro-cyclical fiscal 
policies and thus breaches of the 3% limit during downturns  
We have emphasised debt sustainability as the main raison d’être to uphold 
the Treaty on excessive deficits. Some find this approach too narrow and 
recommend focusing on structural reform from this point onwards. We think 
this is misguided because after all, the main issue is that sustainability is at 
risk. Moreover, experience shows over and over that governments typically 
behave in time inconsistent ways. Trusting that a government will implement 
a structural reform may be foolish (see the cases of Germany and Italy, for 
example). In this case, the SGP, if strengthened along the lines we propose, 
can become some sort of conditionality attached to the implementation of 
structural reforms. 
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Annex 1 
Commission Recommendation to the Council 
on an Excessive Deficit Procedure for Germany 
 
Commission Press Room IP/03/1560 
Brussels, 18 November 2003  
Commission proceeds with Excessive Deficit Procedure for Germany 
The Commission adopted today two recommendations for the Council in 
relation to the Excessive Deficit Procedure for Germany. The first, under 
article 104(8) establishes that the action taken by Germany in 2003 is proving 
inadequate and as a result the excessive deficit will persist in 2004. The 
second, under Article 104(9), requests Germany to take new measures to 
reduce the budget deficit and remedy the situation by 2005 at the latest. In 
order to avoid the risk that the excessive deficit continues for the fourth year in 
a row in 2005, the Commission considers that the budgetary adjustment in 
2004 should be larger than the one contained in the draft Budget for 2004. It is 
recommended to reduce the cyclically-adjusted deficit by 0.8% of GDP in 2004. 
Overall, budgetary consolidation measures should secure a lasting 
improvement in the general government balance. When drawing up the 
measures to be taken in order to comply with these recommendations, 
Germany should take into account the recommendations issued by the Council 
in the framework of the 2003-2005 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
1. They 
highlight the need for structural reforms as the main solution to the growth 
under-performance of the German economy. Today's decision follows the 
Council Recommendation under Article 104(7) of the Treaty on 21 January 
2003.  
The Commission Autumn forecast, published on 29 October, shows a deficit for 
2003 of over 4% of GDP, implying that, contrary to expectations in Spring, 
neither the nominal nor the cyclically-adjusted deficit were reduced despite the 
measures taken by Germany. The forecast confirms, therefore, the German 
authorities' publicly expressed view that the general government deficit in 2004 
is likely to exceed 3% of GDP.  
Despite the budgetary consolidation measures taken during 2003, Germany is 
therefore in non-compliance with the second Art. 104(7) Council 
recommendation issued on 21 January 2003. Germany therefore will not put an 
end to the excessive deficit situation by 2004 as required by the Council. The 
Commission has an obligation under the rules laid down in the Treaty Article 
104(8) and Regulation 1466/97 of the Stability and Growth Pact to inform the 
Council of this fact and recommend further steps to be taken according to Article 
104(9) of the Excessive Deficit Procedure.  THE NINE LIVES OF THE STABILITY PACT | 33 
 
The Commission has considered several arguments when preparing its 
recommendations:  
•  the cumulated loss of real GDP growth over the period 2003-2004 
compared with what was expected in the earlier Autumn 2002 forecast 
amounts to about 2 percentage points.  
•  the fiscal effort necessary to bring the general government deficit below the 
Treaty reference value of 3% of GDP in 2004 is now larger than what was 
expected in January 2003, when the Council adopted the recommendation 
according to Article 104(7). Based on the Autumn 2003 Commission 
forecast, the required improvement in the cyclically-adjusted balance, is 
currently estimated to be of the order of 1.3 percentage points.  
•  The increase in the general government deficit in Germany in recent years 
is a matter of serious concern. If not corrected, it will lead to a continuous 
and large increase in the debt to GDP ratio, which may in turn weigh on 
economic agents' expectations and be damaging for growth. Moreover, the 
impact of the ageing population on public finances will start accelerating 
from 2010 onwards, making it even more urgent to reduce rapidly the 
general government deficit and debt.  
Weighing these arguments, the Commission has opted for granting an extra year 
for the correction of the excessive deficit, as it has proposed for France. In order 
to avoid risks of persistence of the excessive deficit situation in 2005, the 
Commission is of the opinion that roughly two thirds of the required overall 
fiscal consolidation of 1.3% over two years (2004-05) should take place the first 
year, i.e. in 2004. This is in relative terms the same effort as requested for 
France.  
On this basis, the Commission has submitted to the Council an Article 104(9) 
recommendation stipulating that Germany shall:  
put an end to the present excessive deficit situation as rapidly as possible 
and at the latest by 2005;  
achieve in 2004 an annual reduction in the cyclically-adjusted balance by 
0.8 percentage points of GDP;  
achieve in 2005 a further reduction in the cyclically-adjusted deficit by at 
least 0.5 percentage points of GDP or by a larger amount so as to ensure 
that the general government deficit is well below 3% of GDP; and  
allocate any higher-than-expected revenue to deficit reduction and, should 
the recovery in economic activity be stronger than currently expected, 
accelerate the reduction in the cyclically-adjusted deficit.  
When drawing up the measures to be taken in order to comply with these 
recommendations, Germany should take into account the recommendations 
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Guidelines. Moreover, budgetary consolidation measures should secure a lasting 
improvement in the general government balance. They should be geared towards 
an enhancement of the quality of public finances and a reinforcement of the 
growth potential of the economy.  
The Germany authorities are requested to submit by 9 January 2004 a report to 
the Commission outlining the announced decisions to respect the 
recommendations under Article 104(9). Moreover, the German authorities shall 
submit four implementation reports over the next two years, allowing the 
Commission and the Council to assess progress made by the German 
government in correcting the excessive deficit. Such reports should be submitted 
in April and in October of each year following the bi-annual Excessive Deficit 
Procedure notification of deficit and debt data.  | 35 
Annex 2 
Commission Recommendation to the Council 
on an Excessive Deficit Procedure for France 
 
Commission Press Room, IP/30/1420 
Brussels, 21 October 2003  
Commission asks France to take new measures to reduce the budget deficit 
in 2004 
The Commission adopted today a recommendation for the Council to request 
France, in accordance with Article 104(9) of the EC Treaty, to take new 
measures to reduce the budget deficit and remedy the situation of excessive 
deficit. The Commission considers that the budgetary adjustment in 2004 
should be larger than the one contained in the draft Budget for 2004. 
Specifically, it is recommended to reduce the cyclically-adjusted deficit by one 
percentage point of GDP in 2004, which implies additional deficit reduction 
measures of around 0.4 % of GDP. Through such action, the French 
government should put an end to the present excessive deficit situation as 
rapidly as possible and by 2005 at the latest. When drawing up the measures to 
be taken in order to comply with these recommendations, France should take 
into account the recommendations issued by the Council in the framework of 
the 2003-2005 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
1. The need to curb the 
dynamics of spending in the health sector is explicitly included in the 
Guidelines. Overall, budgetary consolidation measures should secure a lasting 
improvement in the general government balance. They should be geared 
towards an enhancement of the quality of public finances and a reinforcement 
of the growth potential of the economy. Today's decision follows the 
Commission recommendation to the Council under Article 108(8) two weeks 
ago (IP/03/1353) establishing that France took no effective action in response 
to the Council's recommendations last June.  
When presenting the budgetary plans for 2004, the French authorities projected a 
decline in the general government deficit from 4.0% of GDP in 2003 to 3.6% of 
GDP in 2004 and to 2.9% in 2005, under the assumption of an increase in real 
GDP by 0.5% in 2003 and 1.7% in 2004. Most of the reduction in the deficit 
between 2003 and 2004 would be achieved through restraint in general 
government expenditure growth. Discretionary measures on the revenue side 
would - on a net basis - reduce the general government deficit by 0.1 percentage 
point of GDP. As far as the years after 2005 are concerned, the French multi-
annual projection for government finances projects a reduction in the general 
government deficit to 2.2% in 2006 and 1.5% in 2007, under the most plausible 
macroeconomic scenario of real GDP growth at 2.5% in 2006 and 2007.  
In June, when issuing its recommendation according to Article 104(7), the 
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France. When defining the new recommendations issued under Article 104(9), 
the Commission has taken the following factors into account:  
The worsening in the economic situation in 2003, which contributed to the 
deterioration of the budgetary situation, was abrupt and unexpected. According 
to the Commission calculations, the cumulated loss of real GDP growth over the 
period 2003-2004 amounts to about 1.5 percentage points compared to what was 
expected in the Spring forecast.  
The deterioration of cyclical conditions has made the effort needed to bring the 
deficit below 3% of GDP in 2004 significantly larger than envisaged last June. 
To obtain such an outcome in 2004 would require a reduction in the cyclically 
adjusted balance of about 1.5% of GDP. Even if budgetary consolidation is not 
necessarily harmful for growth, such a large effort may prove economically 
costly if undertaken in a single year, in particular given the downward revision in 
growth prospects.  
The budgetary plans for 2004 submitted to Parliament in September are targeted 
at a reduction in the cyclically-adjusted deficit slightly larger than the minimum 
amount of 0.5 percentage point of GDP recommended by the Council in June.  
The increase in the general government deficit in France in the recent years is a 
matter of serious concern. If not corrected, it will lead to a continuous and large 
increase in the debt to GDP ratio, which may in turn weigh on economic agents' 
expectations and be damaging for growth. Moreover, the impact of the ageing 
population on public finances will start accelerating from 2005-2006, making it 
even more urgent to reduce rapidly the general government deficit and debt.  
Against this background, the Commission proposes the following 
recommendations to the Council:  
The French authorities shall achieve in 2004 an improvement in the cyclically-
adjusted balance of one percentage point of GDP. This would allow to catch up 
in 2004 for the lack of adjustment in 2003 and to set a credible basis for bringing 
the deficit below 3.0% of GDP in 2005. Given its size, and provided that it is of 
the right composition, the additional adjustment compared to current plans needs 
not be harmful for growth in the short term and, by enhancing the sustainability 
of public finances, will have favourable effects in the longer run.  
In 2005, the French authorities have to achieve an adjustment in the cyclically-
adjusted deficit of at least 0.5 percentage point of GDP or by a larger amount so 
as to ensure that the general government deficit is brought below 3% of GDP.  
Any higher-than-expected revenue in 2004 shall be allocated to deficit reduction 
and, should the recovery in economic activity be stronger than currently 
expected, the improvement in the underlying budgetary position should be 
accelerated.  
When drawing up the measures to be taken in order to comply with these 
recommendations, France should take into account the recommendations issued THE NINE LIVES OF THE STABILITY PACT | 37 
 
by the Council in the framework of the 2003-05 Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines.  
The need to curb the dynamics of spending in the health sector is explicitly 
included in the Guidelines. Overall, budgetary consolidation measures should 
secure a lasting improvement in the general government balance.  
They should be geared towards an enhancement of the quality of public finances 
and a reinforcement of the growth potential of the economy.  
Moreover, the French authorities shall submit by 15 December 2003 a report to 
the Commission outlining the announced decisions to respect the 
recommendations under Article 104(9). As regards 2004, the report shall 
announce the measures or reforms to be implemented and the time-horizon for 
their application. It shall contain estimates of the impact of such measures on the 
general government deficit, including all the relevant assumptions made for the 
quantification. As regards 2005, the report shall indicate as clearly as possible 
the measures or reforms envisaged by the government. This report will be 
examined by the Commission and the Council assess compliance by France with 
the Council decision.  
The French authorities shall prepare four implementation reports over the next 
two years for allowing the Commission and the Council to monitor the progress 
of the French government in correcting the excessive deficit. Such reports should 
be submitted in April and in October of each year following the bi-annual 
Excessive Deficit Procedure notification of deficit and debt data. Each of these 
reports will be examined by the Commission and the Council to assess 
compliance by France with the Council decision.  
Background  
Based on the evidence that the government deficit in France amounted to 3.1 per 
cent of GDP in 2002 and on a report from the Commission made in accordance 
with Article 104(3), the Council decided on 3 June that an excessive deficit 
exists in France. At the same time, the Council adopted a recommendation 
according to Article 104(7) of the Treaty with the aim of bringing the situation of 
excessive deficit to an end in 2004 at the latest. The Council established the 
deadline of 3 October 2003 for the French government to take appropriate 
measures to this end. On 8 October 2003, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 104(8) of the Treaty, the Commission recommended the Council to 
decide that no effective action has been taken in response to the recommendation 
addressed under Article 104(7).  
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Annex 3 
Council Conclusions of 25 November 2003 
14492/1/03 REV 1 (en) (Presse 320) 
2546th Council meeting 
- ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS - 
Brussels, 25 November 2003 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT 
 
– France 
The Council took a vote on a Commission Recommendation for a Council 
Decision under Article 104(8) of the Treaty in respect of France. 
 
With Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Netherlands, Austria, Finland and 
Sweden voting in favour, the Presidency concluded that there was not a qualified 
majority for adopting the Decision. The Decision was therefore not adopted. 
 
The Council also took a vote on a Commission Recommendation for a Council 
Decision under Article 104(9) of the Treaty in respect of France. 
With Belgium Greece, Spain, Netherlands, Austria and Finland voting in favour, 
the Presidency concluded that there was not a qualified majority for adopting the 
Decision. The Decision was therefore not adopted. 
 
It is recalled that only countries which have adopted the euro are allowed to vote 
on Decisions on the Article 104(9) of the Treaty. 
 
The Council, with Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Portugal voting in favour, adopted the following conclusions regarding France (it 
is recalled that the same voting rules as for a Decision under Article 104(9) 
apply): 
 
“Council conclusions on assessing the actions taken by France in response to 
recommendations of the Council according to Article 104(7) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and considering further measures 
for deficit reduction in order to remedy the situation of excessive deficit 
 
1.  In assessing the budgetary situation of France, the Council has taken several 
considerations into account, in particular: 
a.  By Council Decision 2003/487/EC2, it was decided, in accordance with 
Article 104(6) of the Treaty, that an excessive deficit existed in France. 
b.  In accordance with Article 104(7) of the Treaty and Article 3(4) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, the Council sent a Recommendation to 
France on 3 June 2003 requesting it to take measures to bring the THE NINE LIVES OF THE STABILITY PACT | 39 
 
existence of an excessive deficit to an end in 2004 at the latest. The 
Recommendation was made public. 
c.  Several important economic and budgetary developments have taken 
place since spring 2003, which the Commission recommended be taken 
into account: (i) the worsening in cyclical developments was abrupt and 
unexpected and made the effort to bring the deficit below 3% of GDP in 
2004 much greater than expected in June 2003; the Commission spring 
forecast foresaw a growth rate for France of 1,1% in 2003 and 2,3% in 
2004; in autumn the forecast was revised to 0,1% in 2003 and 1,7% in 
2004; (ii) the cumulated loss of real GDP growth over the period 2003-
2004 compared to what was expected in the spring now amounts to 
about 1,5 percentage points; (iii) the budgetary plans for 2004 submitted 
to Parliament in September are targeted at a reduction in the cyclically-
adjusted deficit of 0,7 percentage points of GDP, slightly more than the 
0,5 recommended by the Council in June. Consideration was also given 
to the fact that the French Government committed to implementing in 
2004 a structural reform of health insurance, with the aim of curbing the 
dynamic of health expenditure, which constituted a major problem in 
controlling general Government expenditure in recent years. 
d.  The argument stressed by the Commission, that too great a 
consolidation effort in a single year might prove economically costly, in 
particular in the light of the downward revision of growth forecasts, 
should be given the appropriate relevance. On the basis of this 
argument, the Commission considered that the deadline which was set 
in June for the elimination of the excessive deficit in France should be 
extended by one year, provided that effective measures are taken by the 
French authorities as from 2004. 
e.  It is paramount that France moves rapidly towards a situation in which 
government finances are close to balance or in surplus. Such an 
underlying budgetary position must be achieved to ensure a rapid 
reduction in the debt to GDP ratio below the 60% of GDP reference 
value of the Treaty. 
2.  The Council noted that, following the Council Recommendation of 3 June 
2003, France has adopted a number of structural measures, having an impact 
on 2003 and in the following years. The budget law entails a reduction of the 
structural deficit in 2004 estimated at 0,7% of GDP. 
3.  The Council welcomes the public commitment by France to implement all 
the necessary measures to ensure that the deficit will be below 3% of GDP 
in 2005 at the latest. 
4.  In the light of the Commission Recommendation and the commitments 
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a.  achieve in 2004 an annual reduction in the cyclically-adjusted deficit of 
0,8 percent of GDP; 
b.  achieve in 2005 a reduction in the cyclically-adjusted deficit of at least 
0,6 percent of GDP or a larger amount so as to ensure that the general 
government deficit is brought below 3 percent of GDP; 
c.  should the recovery in economic activity be stronger than currently 
expected, a allocate any higher-than-expected revenue to deficit 
reduction and accelerate the reduction in the cyclically-adjusted deficit; 
d.  ensure that the budgetary consolidation continues in the years after 
2005, namely through a steady reduction in the cyclically-adjusted 
budgetary deficit by at least 0.5 percentage points of GDP per year or 
more if necessary to achieve the medium term position of government 
finances close to balance or in surplus and bring back the debt ratio to a 
declining path; 
e.  outline a strategy consistent with these commitments and based on 
prudent macroeconomic assumptions in the Stability Programme to be 
updated by December 2003; 
f.  take into account the recommendations issued by the Council in the 
framework of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines when 
implementing the measures to be taken in order to comply with the 
above commitments; 
g.  put an end to the present excessive deficit situation as rapidly as 
possible and at the latest by 2005. 
5.  In the light of the recommendations and the commitments by France set out 
above, the Council decided not to act, at this point in time, on the basis of 
the Commission Recommendation for a Council decision under Article 
104(9). 
6.  The Council agrees to hold the Excessive Deficit Procedure for France in 
abeyance for the time being. The Council stands ready to take a decision 
under Article 104(9), on the basis of the Commission Recommendation, 
should France fail to act in accordance with the commitments set out in 
these Conclusions as it would emerge from the assessment based on 
paragraph 7 below. 
7.  The Council invites France to regularly report on the progress made in 
fulfilling the commitments set out above, in particular in the context of the 
biannual notifications. In assessing the progress achieved, the Council and 
the Commission will give due attention to the prevailing economic 
conditions and to the structural reforms being implemented in France with a 
view to strengthening growth and ensuring the long term sustainability of 
public finances.” 
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– Germany 
The Council took a vote on a Commission Recommendation for a Council 
Decision under Article 104(8) of the Treaty in respect of Germany. 
 
With Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Netherlands, Austria, Finland and 
Sweden voting in favour, the Presidency concluded that there was not a qualified 
majority for adopting the Decision. The Decision was therefore not adopted. 
 
The Council also took a vote on a Commission Recommendation for a Council 
Decision under Article 104(9) of the Treaty in respect of Germany.  
With Belgium Greece, Spain, Netherlands, Austria and Finland voting in favour, 
the Presidency concluded that there was not a qualified majority for adopting the 
Decision. The Decision was therefore not adopted. 
 
It is recalled that only countries which have adopted the euro are allowed to vote 
on Decisions on the Article 104(9) of the Treaty. 
 
The Council, with Belgium, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Portugal voting in favour, adopted the following conclusions regarding Germany 
(it is recalled that the same voting rules as for a Decision under 104(9) apply): 
 
“Council conclusions on assessing the actions taken by Germany in response 
to recommendations of the Council according to Article 104(7) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and considering further measures 
for deficit reduction in order to remedy the situation of excessive deficit 
 
1.  In assessing the budgetary situation of Germany, the Council has taken 
several considerations into account, in particular: 
 
i.  By Council Decision 2003/89/EC3 it was decided, in accordance with 
Article 104(6) of the Treaty, that an excessive deficit existed in 
Germany. 
ii.  In accordance with Article 104(7) of the Treaty and Article 3(4) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, the Council sent a Recommendation to 
Germany on 21 January 2003 establishing the deadline of 21 May 2003 
for Germany to take measures to bring the existence of an excessive 
deficit to an end as rapidly as possible. The Recommendation was made 
public. 
iii.  On the basis of information available upon the expiry of the deadline of 
21 May 2003, the policies announced by the German authorities 
satisfied the requirement of budget consolidation measures amounting 
to 1 % of GDP set out in the Recommendation of 21 January 2003. 
iv.  Several important economic and budgetary developments have taken 
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abrupt and unexpected and made the effort to bring the deficit below 
3% of GDP in 2004 much greater than expected in May 2003; the 
Commission spring forecast foresaw a growth rate for Germany of 0,4% 
in 2003 and 2,0% in 2004; in autumn the forecast was revised to 0,0% 
in 2003 and 1,6% in 2004; (ii) the cumulative loss of real GDP growth 
over the period 2003-2004 compared to what was expected in the spring 
now amounts to nearly 2 percentage points. 
v.  The following arguments, which the Commission stressed, should be 
given the appropriate relevance: (i) too great a consolidation effort in 
one single year might prove economically costly in view of the 
prolonged stagnation in Germany over the last three years and the 
expected slow recovery; and (ii) government proposals for structural 
reforms would boost potential growth and reduce the deficit in the 
medium to long term. 
vi.  Taking into account these factors, and in order to provide the conditions 
for a balanced correction, the Commission considered that it appears 
that the deadline set in January 2003 for the elimination of the excessive 
deficit in Germany should be extended by one year, provided that 
effective measures are taken by the German authorities as from 2004. 
vii.  It is paramount that Germany moves rapidly towards a situation in 
which government finances are close to balance or in surplus. Such an 
underlying budgetary position must be achieved to ensure a rapid 
reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio below the reference value of 60% 
referred to in the Treaty. 
2.  The Council noted that, following the Council Recommendation of 21 
January 2003, Germany has made a substantive adjustment adopting several 
measures, which have a total impact on government finances in 2003 that is 
estimated by the Commission to be 1 percent of GDP. 
 
3.  The Council welcomes the public commitment by Germany to implement all 
the necessary measures to ensure that the deficit will be below 3% of GDP 
in 2005 at the latest, on the basis of the Commission’s GDP growth 
projections. 
 
4.  In the light of the Commission Recommendation and the commitments 
made by Germany, the Council recommends Germany to: 
 
a.  achieve in 2004 an annual reduction in the cyclically-adjusted deficit of 
0,6 percent of GDP; 
b.  achieve in 2005 a reduction in the cyclically-adjusted deficit of at least 
0,5 percent of GDP or a larger amount so as to ensure that the general 
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c.  should the recovery in economic activity be stronger than currently 
expected, allocate any higher-than-expected revenue to deficit reduction 
and accelerate the reduction in the cyclically-adjusted deficit; 
d.  ensure that the budgetary consolidation continues in the years after 
2005, namely through a steady reduction in the cyclically-adjusted 
budgetary deficit by at least 0,5 percentage points of GDP per year or 
more if necessary to achieve the medium term position of government 
finances close to balance or in surplus and bring back the debt ratio to a 
declining path; 
e.  outline a strategy consistent with these commitments and based on 
prudent macroeconomic assumptions in the Stability Programme to be 
updated by December 2003;  
f.  take into account the recommendations issued by the Council in the 
framework of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines when 
implementing the measures to be taken in order to comply with the 
above commitments; 
g.  put an end to the present excessive deficit situation as rapidly as 
possible and at the latest by 2005. 
5.  In the light of the recommendations and the commitments by Germany set 
out above, the Council decided not to act, at this point in time, on the basis 
of the Commission Recommendation for a Council decision under Article 
104(9). 
 
6.  The Council agrees to hold the Excessive Deficit Procedure for Germany in 
abeyance for the time being. The Council stands ready to take a decision 
under Article 104(9), on the basis of the Commission Recommendation, 
should Germany fail to act in accordance with the commitments set out in 
these conclusions as it would emerge from the assessment based on 
paragraph 7 below. 
 
7.  The Council invites Germany to report regularly on the progress made in 
fulfilling the commitments set out above, in particular in the context of the 
biannual notifications. In assessing the progress achieved, the Council and 
the Commission will give due attention to the prevailing economic 
conditions and to the structural reforms being implemented in Germany with 
a view to strengthening growth and ensuring long term sustainability of 
public finances.” 
 
The Council unanimously adopted the following conclusion: 
“The Council: 
-  confirms its strong commitment to sound public finances as a basis for 
strong economic growth and increased employment, in accordance with the 
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-  recalls the central role played by the Stability and Growth Pact in ensuring 
an improvement in the overall budgetary situation in the EU, and 
encouraging the development by the Member States of sound and 
sustainable budgetary policies; 
-  reaffirms its commitment to the Stability and Growth Pact as the framework 
for the coordination of budgetary policies in the European Union with the 
particular 
-  objectives of achieving budgetary positions of close to balance or in surplus 
over the business cycle and public finances that are sustainable in the long 
term; 
-  will, to achieve these objectives, strengthen the monitoring of budgetary 
developments in the Member States in accordance with the surveillance 
procedures laid down by the Treaty and the Pact; 
-  reaffirms the determination to implement the provisions of the Stability and 
Growth Pact by ensuring equality of treatment across Member States and the 
role of the Commission in this area; 
-  will pay particular attention within the surveillance framework to the full 
and timely implementation of the firm commitments given by those Member 
States whose budgetary positions require significant improvement in order 
to meet the Pact's medium term objective; 
-  undertakes to strengthen the implementation of the Pact by reinforcing 
budgetary discipline over the cycle and fostering structural reforms aimed at 
increasing growth potential.” 
The Commission entered in the Council minutes the following statement: 
 
“The Commission takes note of the rejection by the Council of the Commission 
recommendation under Article 104(8) for France and Germany, without giving 
the adequate explanation as laid down in the European Council Resolution on the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The Commission therefore considers that the Council 
recommendations based on Article 104(7) remain in force.  
The Commission deeply regrets that the Council has not followed the spirit and 
the rules of the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact that were agreed 
unanimously by all Member States. Only a rule-based system can guarantee that 
commitments are enforced and that all Member States are treated equally. 
 
The Commission will continue to apply the Treaty and reserves the right to 
examine the implications of these Council conclusions and decide on possible 
subsequent actions.” 
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Annex 4 
Council Recommendation in the Context of 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure for Germany 
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION TO GERMANY 
of 21 January 2003 
with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government 
deficit - Application of Article 104(7) of the Treaty 
 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,  
 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in 
particular Article 104(7) thereof,  
 
Having regard to the recommendation from the Commission under Article 
104(7) and Article 104(13),  
 
Whereas in stage three of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Member 
States according to Article 104 of the Treaty shall avoid excessive government 
deficits.  
 
Whereas the Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound 
government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price 
stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation.  
 
Whereas the Amsterdam Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and 
Growth Pact of 17 June 1997 solemnly invites all parties, namely the Member 
States, the Council and the Commission, to implement the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact in a strict and timely manner.  
 
Whereas the Council has decided, in accordance with Article 104 (6), that an 
excessive deficit exists in Germany.  
 
Whereas having decided on the existence of an excessive deficit in Germany, the 
Council, in accordance with Article 104(7) of the Treaty and Article 3(4) of 
Regulation EC 1467/97, shall adopt a Recommendation establishing a deadline 
of four months at the most for effective action to be taken by Germany to correct 
the excessive deficit position; whereas the Council takes note of the budgetary 
measures announced in November 2002, which aim at reducing the deficit level 
to 2 ¾% of GDP in 2003, as well as those planned for 2004; whereas the Council 
welcomes the measures announced by the German authorities but shall establish 
a deadline of 21 May 2003 at the latest for the German government to take 
measures to bring the existence of an excessive deficit to an end within the 
deadline established by this Council Recommendation.  
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Whereas Article 3(4) of Regulation EC 1467/97 requires that the 
Recommendation adopted by the Council in accordance with Article 104(7) also 
establishes a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit, which should be 
completed in the year following its identification.  
 
Whereas the German government adopted a federal budget aiming at a general 
government deficit of 2 ¾% for 2003; whereas on 18 December, the German 
government adopted an updated Stability Programme aiming at a balanced 
budget in 2006 in a central scenario.  
 
Whereas, in accordance with Article 104(12) of the Treaty, a Council decision 
under Article 104(6) on the existence of an excessive deficit will only be 
abrogated if the excessive deficit, in the view of the Council, has been corrected; 
whereas the Council will take into account compliance with the recommendation 
made under Article 104(7) when taking decisions in accordance with Article 
104(12),  
 
HEREBY RECOMMENDS:  
 
-    the German government to put an end to the present excessive deficit 
situation as rapidly as possible in accordance with Article 3(4) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97;  
 
-  the German authorities to implement with resolve their budgetary plans for 
2003 which, on the basis of GDP growth projections of 1 ½% in 2003, aim 
at reducing the general government deficit in 2003 to 2 ¾% of GDP; in 
particular, the German authorities should ensure a rigorous budgetary 
execution and a thorough implementation of the measures announced for 
2003 amounting to 1% of GDP. The Council establishes a deadline of 21 
May 2003 at the latest for the German government to take such measures. If 
some of these measures are not implemented, the German government 
should adopt and implement compensatory measures to ensure a reduction 
of the government deficit in 2003 as planned. In addition, the Council 
recommends the German authorities to ensure that the rise in the debt ratio 
is brought to a halt in 2003 and reversed thereafter.  
 
In addition, the Council notes the commitments of the German authorities:  
 
-   to implement structural reforms which should vigorously address the need to 
raise the growth potential of the German economy and, in this way, also be 
conducive to the achievement of a medium-term budgetary position of close 
to balance or in surplus, and to a debt ratio brought back to a declining path;  
 
-  to ensure that the momentum of budgetary consolidation is maintained 
throughout the period covered by the December 2002 update of the Stability 
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by more than 0.5% of GDP per year, with the exception of 2005 due to the 
introduction of tax reforms, which in turn requires the introduction of 
structural reforms;  
 
-   to reinforce the co-ordination mechanisms of budgetary policy in Germany 
and to secure the process of budgetary consolidation. In this regard, the 
Council notes with satisfaction the approval and implementation of the new 
§51a Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz (‘law on budgetary procedures’) aimed at 
strengthening budgetary co-ordination and fiscal discipline among the 
constituent sectors of general government, thereby assisting in the 
management of fiscal policy; the Council welcomes the efforts that are being 
made by the German government to reduce the government deficit on a 
permanent basis and encourages the German government to implement these 
policies with determination.  
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Annex 5 
Council Recommendation in the Context of 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure for France
∗ 
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION TO FRANCE with a view to bringing an end 
to the situation of an excessive government deficit - Application of Article 
104(7) of the Treaty 
 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in 
particular Article 104(7) thereof, 
 
Having regard to the recommendation from the Commission under Article 
104(7) and Article 104(13), 
 
Whereas: 
 
(1)   In stage three of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Member States 
according to Article 104 of the Treaty shall avoid excessive government 
deficits. 
 
(2)    The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound 
government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price 
stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment 
creation. 
 
(3)   The Amsterdam Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and 
Growth Pact of 17 June 1997 solemnly invites all parties, namely the 
Member States, the Council and the Commission to implement the Treaty 
and the Stability and Growth pact in a strict and timely manner. 
 
(4)    The Council has decided, in accordance with Article 104 (6), that an 
excessive deficit exists in France. 
 
(5)   Having decided on the existence of an excessive deficit in France, the 
Council, in accordance with Article 104(7) of the Treaty and Article 3(4) 
of Regulation (EC) 1467/97, shall adopt a Recommendation establishing a 
deadline of four months at the most for effective action to be taken by 
France to correct the excessive deficit position; whereas the Council shall 
establish a deadline of 3 October 2003 at the latest for the French 
government to take measures to bring the existence of an excessive deficit 
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to an end within the deadline established by this Council 
Recommendation. 
 
(6)   Article 3(4) of Regulation (EC) 1467/97 requires that the 
Recommendation adopted by the Council in accordance with Article 
104(7) also establishes a deadline for the correction of the excessive 
deficit, which should be completed in the year following its identification. 
 
(7)    In accordance with Article 104(12) of the Treaty, a Council decision 
under Article 104(6) on the existence of an excessive deficit will only be 
abrogated if the excessive deficit, in the view of the Council, has been 
corrected; whereas the Council will take into account compliance with the 
recommendation made under Article 104(7) when taking decisions in 
accordance with Article 104(12). 
 
(8)   In January 2003, the Council adopted a recommendation sending an early 
warning to France in order to avoid the occurrence of an excessive deficit 
in 20038, in accordance with Article 99(4) of the Treaty and Article 6(2) 
of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and co-ordination 
of economic policies. In this recommendation, the Council stated that —
the French government should take all the appropriate measures in order 
to ensure that the general government deficit does not breach the 3% of 
GDP threshold in 2003“, and that —adopting measures apt to improve the 
cyclically-adjusted budgetary position by at least 0,5 percentage point of 
GDP would not only reduce the risk for the general government deficit to 
breach the 3% of GDP threshold in 2003, but also contribute to resuming 
a budgetary consolidation path towards a close to balance position as from 
2003“. 
 
(9)   In February 2003, the French authorities decided, in order to control State 
expenditure in 2003, to put in reserve 4 billion (0.25% of GDP) on the 
State budget, of which 1,44 billion (0.1% of GDP) were cancelled in 
March; besides, the French authorities decided, in order to control health 
expenditure, several measures, such as a reduction in the reimbursement 
rate of some drugs of limited medical utility. When presenting their new 
official forecast in March 2003, the French authorities projected real GDP 
growth in 2003 at 1.3% and an improvement in the cyclically-adjusted 
general government balance by 0.1 percentage point of GDP in 2003; 
whereas, in the same forecast, the general government deficit in France 
for 2003 was projected to reach 3.4 per cent of GDP. 
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(10)    In the view of the Council, budgetary consolidation measures should 
secure a lasting improvement in the general government balance, while 
being geared towards enhancing the quality of the public finances and 
reinforcing the growth potential of the economy, 
 
HEREBY RECOMMENDS: 
 
1.    the French authorities to put an end to the present excessive deficit 
situation as rapidly as possible and by 2004 at the latest, in accordance 
with Article 3(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. The Council 
establishes the deadline of 3 October 2003 for the French government to 
take appropriate measures to this end; 
 
2.   the French authorities to achieve a significantly larger improvement in the 
cyclically-adjusted deficit in 2003 than that currently planned; 
 
3.   the French authorities to implement measures ensuring that the cyclically-
adjusted deficit is reduced in 2004 by 0.5% of GDP, or by a larger 
amount, so as to ensure that the cumulative improvement in 2003-2004 is 
enough to bring the nominal deficit below 3% in 2004 at the latest; 
 
4.   that France limits the increase in the general government gross debt to 
GDP ratio in 2003. 
 
In addition, the Council: 
 
œ    notes the commitment of the French authorities to ensure that the 
budgetary consolidation continues in the years after 2004 as reflected by 
the December 2002 update of the Stability Programme, namely through a 
reduction in the cyclically-adjusted budgetary deficit by at least 0.5 
percentage point of GDP per year, in order to move decisively towards the 
medium term position of government finances close to balance or in 
surplus and bring back the debt ratio to a declining path; 
 
œ   notes the commitment of the French authorities to ensure a tighter control 
of expenditures in 2003; 
 
œ   and welcomes the commitment of the French government to achieve the 
pension reform already in process to secure the long-term sustainability of 
public finances. 
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Annex 6 
Wording of Question and Possible Responses 
in German Public Opinion Poll on Fiscal Policy 
Query: “In case the federal government and the Bundesrat (the German federal 
chamber) agree to implement the third step of the tax reform to next year, what 
effect will the tax reform have on your personal spending?”  
 
  Total 
Responses %  % 
I will immediately increase my 
purchases. 
2 2 
I will increase my purchases only 
once the tax reform enters into 
force. 
15 10 
I will not spend more even after 
the tax reform has come into force. 
78 81 
No answer  5  8 
 July  2003  November  2003 
Source: Exclusive telephone survey for the German Press Agency by Polis, Munich 
(45/2003), translation by author. 
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